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Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome -Taiwan, 2003
On April 22, 2003, the Taiwan Department of Health (DOH) was notified of seven cases of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) among health-care workers (HCWs) at a large municipal hospital in Taipei (hospital A). Subsequent cases at eight hospitals have been associated with exposures at hospital A. Previously, all reported cases had been associated with persons recently returning to Taiwan from SARS-affected regions. This report summarizes epidemiologic findings of the outbreak in Taiwan and describes the impact of healthcare-associated transmission of SARS.
As of May 22, a total of 483 probable cases had been reported ( Figure 1 ). All probable SARS patients were hospitalized; 84 (17%) had been discharged, and 60 (12%) had died (Table) . The median age of probable SARS patients was 43 years (range: 9 months-91 years); 341 (71%) cases were from Taipei City and Taipei County, the largest metropolitan region of the island. The first patient reported had onset of illness on February 25; the majority of cases occurred after April 21 and were associated with transmission in health-care settings.
Initial Cases (March 14-April 21)
Taiwan (2002 population: 23 million) has extensive business ties with Hong Kong and mainland China where SARS cases have been reported. The first case in Taiwan was identified on March 14 in a traveler from Guangdong Province in China. During March 14-April 21, Taiwan reported 28 probable SARS cases; of these, four resulted from secondary transmission (one HCW and three family contacts). During this period, SARS was characterized by sporadic cases among business travelers who were cared for primarily at large academic hospitals; secondary spread was limited to identified contacts. Initial actions by DOH included the formation of a SARS advisory committee, infection-control training, contact tracing and quarantine, and airport and border surveillance.
Because of Taiwan's success with SARS control, in early April, the World Health Organization changed Taiwan's designation from an "affected area" to an "area with limited local transmission."
Health-Care-Associated Transmission (April 22-May 22)
Since April 22, SARS cases in Taiwan have increased and have been associated primarily with health-care settings. During April 22-May 1, the number of probable cases in Taiwan more than tripled, from 28 to 89. The source of the outbreak was hospital A, where an unrecognized SARS index patient had multiple exposures with patients, visitors, and HCWs who were not protected adequately to prevent acquisition of SARS.
Hospital A. The index patient was a laundry worker aged 42 years with diabetes mellitus and peripheral vascular disease who was employed at hospital A. On April 12, the worker had onset of fever and diarrhea and was evaluated in the emergency department (ED) on April 12, 14, and 15. The patient remained on duty and interacted frequently with patients, staff, and visitors. The patient had sleeping quarters in the hospital's basement and spent off-duty time socializing in the ED. On April 16, because of worsening symptoms, the patient was admitted to ward 8B of the hospital with a diagnosis of infectious enteritis. Stool samples revealed the presence of leukocytes, but cultures were negative. The patient was treated with intravenous antibiotics and the fever resolved. On April 18, the patient became short of breath. A chest radiograph showed bilateral infiltrates, and the patient was transferred to an isolation room in the intensive care unit for possible SARS. During the next few days, the patient had progressive respiratory failure and was intubated on April 22. A polymerase chain reaction (PCR) test was positive for SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV); the patient died on April 29. The source of infection for the patient is unknown.
The initial cluster of SARS cases reported on April 22 from hospital A included patients, visitors, and HCWs. The symptomatic HCWs included two nurses, a doctor, an administrator, a radiology technician, a nursing student, and another laundry worker. On the basis of epidemiologic links among the cases, 61 HCWs were identified and quarantined. Within 24 hours, 10 additional cases were identified from hospital A; none were from this quarantined cohort. By April 23, cases had been identified from the ED and from six different floors of the hospital, including ward 8B where the index patient had been admitted. The work location and number of case reports suggested widespread transmission. Because the index patient had been symptomatic for 6 days before SARS was diagnosed, the number of potentially exposed persons was estimated at 10,000 patients and visitors and 930 staff.
On April 23, DOH convened an emergency task force to plan the response to SARS transmission in hospital A. On April 24, hospital A was contained, and all patients, visitors, and staff were quarantined within the building. Home quarantine also was mandated for discharged patients and visitors who had been at hospital A since April 9. Inside the hospital, all recognized SARS patients were cohorted on two floors. Personal protective equipment (PPE) and disinfection materials were distributed, and active surveillance was enforced for all HCWs. However, incident SARS cases in hospital A continued to increase. During April 29-May 8, a total of 81 SARS patients were transferred to 15 hospitals throughout Taipei; it is unknown whether any of these patients were associated with secondary cases in other hospitals. All of the remaining patients (approximately 200) whose illnesses were not consistent with SARS case definitions were discharged to home quarantine or transferred to other facilities. As of May 22, a total of 137 probable cases were associated with exposures at hospital A, including 45 (33%) cases among HCWs; 26 (19%) persons died.
Secondary Clusters. To date, HCW clusters at eight additional hospitals in Taiwan have been linked to the initial out-break at hospital A. Preliminary data suggest that many of these clusters occurred when presymptomatic patients or patients with SARS symptoms attributed to other causes were discharged or transferred to other health-care facilities. SARS has now extended to multiple cities and regions of Taiwan, including several university and private hospitals ( Figure 2 ). Four of these hospitals, including a 2,300-bed facility in southern Taiwan, have discontinued emergency and routine services. Sporadic community cases also have been reported in Taipei and southern Taiwan.
In response, DOH has reorganized its outbreak response structure, appointed a SARS task force commander, and created an emergency operations center. Efforts have focused on limiting nosocomial transmission by designating dedicated SARS hospitals throughout the island. Approximately 100 fever clinics also have been established to identify potential SARS patients and minimize risk for transmission in EDs. Patient care capacity will be expanded by the construction of 1,000 negative pressure isolation rooms; by the end of May, approximately 1,700 such rooms will be available. Campsites and military facilities have been identified to accommodate quarantined residents, and home quarantine will be enforced through web-based cameras. Screening for fever in all patients, HCWs, and visitors has been instituted at all health-care facilities. DOH also has developed an infection-control curriculum to train infection-control teams on educating and monitoring HCWs. Standard operating procedures for the management and containment of nosocomial SARS clusters are being finalized. Editorial Note: Efforts to control SARS in Taiwan appeared to be effective for approximately 5 weeks after identification of the first travel-associated case (1) . Despite national efforts to implement extensive control measures, unrecognized cases of SARS led to nosocomial clusters and subsequent spread to other health-care facilities and community settings. These clusters resulted in substantial morbidity and mortality and resulted in the closure of several large health-care facilities. In one neighborhood in Taipei, three hospitals were affected, impacting facility access and deterring residents from seeking routine medical care. Although nosocomial transmission of SARS has been welldocumented, Taiwan's experience demonstrates that spread among HCWs can occur despite knowledge about the epidemiology and transmission of SARS. Multiple factors probably contributed to the rapid and widespread transmission in hospital A. The index patient had been symptomatic with fever and diarrhea for 6 days before SARS was suspected, and infection-control procedures were implemented. SARS infection-control guidelines focused primarily on health-care workers. However, in Taiwan, visitors include personal attendants hired by families to provide care for inpatients. Personal attendants are not routinely supplied with PPE; some personal attendants had SARS and might have contributed to disease spread.
Unrecognized cases of SARS also have been implicated in recent outbreaks at health-care facilities in Singapore (2). The number of new cases reported in the United States has been decreasing in recent weeks. The epidemiologic profile of reported cases remains unchanged with most cases associated with international travel and few instances of secondary spread to family members or other contacts. However, vigilance is critical to ensure rapid recognition and appropriate management of persons with SARS The low specificity of the surveillance case definition captures many persons unlikely to have SARS. The CDC surveillance case definition has been revised to include interim criteria for excluding new or previously reported suspect or probable cases of SARS for whom an alternative diagnosis can fully explain the patient's illness (2) . Factors that might be considered in assigning alternative diagnoses include the strength of the epidemiologic exposure criteria for SARS, the specificity of the diagnostic tests, and the compatibility of the clinical presentation and course of illness for the alternative diagnosis. The epidemiologic criteria for travel exposure also have been revised and now reflect updated information about the occurrence of community transmission in areas with SARS. Hanoi, Vietnam and Toronto, Canada are now considered areas with previous community transmission of SARS because >30 days have elapsed since the onset of symptoms for the Month and day 13 15 17
Number last reported case (4) . As a result, travel alerts for these cities were removed on May 15 and May 20, respectively. Persons reporting travel to these areas will meet the surveillance case definition if illness onset occurred within 10 days (i.e., one incubation period) after removal of the travel alert. These revisions to the case definition are for surveillance purposes only. Clinical judgment, rather than surveillance criteria, should continue to guide the management of patients and implementation of public health response measures when persons with an unknown respiratory illness are identified.
As state and local health departments review and reclassify cases using these new criteria, case counts might change but the result will more accurately reflect the occurrence of SARS in the United States. cdc.gov/mmwr Albert Einstein In August 1998, citing a need to control insecurity on their western borders, Rwanda and Uganda sent troops into the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (estimated 2002 population: 51 million). Within 6 months, troops from seven neighboring countries were fighting in the DRC, with various Congolese groups supporting different invading armies (1). During 1998-2002, the majority of the fighting occurred in the DRC's five eastern provinces (1996 population: 19.9 million). To assess the impact of the armed conflict on public health, the International Rescue Committee (IRC), with support from CDC, conducted a nationwide mortality survey to measure DRC's nationwide crude mortality rate (CMR) and to compare CMRs in DRC's five eastern provinces with CMRs in the five western provinces. This report summarizes the results of the survey, which indicate that the overall CMR in the DRC is the highest in the world, with the majority of deaths caused by preventable infectious diseases. The findings underscore the importance of the ongoing peace process, which appears to have contributed to a decrease in mortality rates in eastern DRC, and highlights the importance of collecting population-based health data regularly during armed conflicts.
Continuing Education
Conducted during September 14-November 13, 2002, the survey employed a three-stage cluster approach to measure CMRs. In the first stage, 20 health zones were selected systematically proportional to the population: 10 in the waraffected areas of the five eastern provinces (Katanga, Maniema, North Kivu, Orientale, and South Kivu) and 10 in the five western provinces (Bandundu, Bas Congo, Equateur, Kasai Occidentale, and Kasai Orientale) ( Figure) . Of approximately 14.3 million persons in the war-affected areas of the five eastern provinces, 5 million (35%) could not be visited because of ongoing fighting, and the health zones in which these persons live were excluded from the site selection process. All health zones in the five western provinces were available for selection. In the second stage, 15 locations were selected in each targeted health zone, with the probability of selection proportional to population; the locations comprised the smallest known population units (i.e., specific avenues, clinic areas, or villages). In the final stage, a specific household was selected by using one of three methods: 1) counting all households in the selected population and selecting one at random; 2) dividing the selected population into roughly equal segments, selecting one segment at random, counting the households in that segment, and selecting one at random; or 3) selecting a random point in space by using a map and a global positioning system unit if the population was spread over an entire clinic area with no further population breakdown.
Interviewers visited the selected households and explained the purpose of the survey to a person aged >14 years. A person consenting to an interview was asked about the age and sex of current household residents and the occurrence of any pregnancies, births, or deaths among current residents since January 2002. From households selected initially, interviewers visited the next 14 closest occupied households. If no person aged >14 years was home, or if members of a household refused to be interviewed, the household was skipped and the next was visited. Persons were included as household residents only if they had slept in that household on the preceding night.
CMRs were calculated by using the following formula: CMR = (number of deaths / number of living residents minus half the number of births plus half the number of deaths) x 1,000 / the number of months in the recall period. Deaths were included if a decedent had slept in the interviewed household or lived with the interviewed family at the time of death during 2002. The recall period was January 1, 2002, through the median day of the specific health zone evaluation (median: 9.3 months; range: 8.5-10.3 months). The mortality rate for children aged <5 years (<5MR) was estimated by using the following formula: <5MR = (number of deaths among children aged <5 years/number of children aged 
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<5 years who were alive at the time of the survey plus one half of deaths among those aged <5 years during recall period) x 1,000 / the number of months in the recall period. This equation assumes that both the total number of children born and the number of children who turned age 5 years remained constant during the recall period. Mortality in this survey was expressed as deaths per 1,000 population per month. Previous findings indicate that a baseline CMR of 1.5 deaths per 1,000 population per month occurs in poor areas of sub-Saharan Africa in the absence of armed conflict (2) .
No person aged >14 years was present at the time of the survey in 488 (17.9%) of 2,717 households visited in the east and in 672 (23.0%) of 2,927 households visited in the west. Of 4,484 households in which a person aged >14 years was present at the time of the survey, 4,475 (99.8%) agreed to participate, and nine (0.2%) declined. Of the 10 selected eastern health zones, two could not be surveyed, one because of the refusal of local authorities and one because of security constraints. In each case, the closest neighboring health zone was surveyed. Of the 150 locations selected among the 10 eastern health zones visited, five (3.0%) were not surveyed because of time and logistic constraints, and five (3.0%) could not be reached for security reasons; if a location could not be reached, the nearest accessible village was visited instead. All 10 selected western health zones were surveyed, and all 150 locations were reached.
During January-September 2002, CMR in the eastern provinces was 3.5 deaths per 1,000 population per month (95% confidence interval [CI] = 2.2-4.9), and the <5MR was 9.0 (95% CI = 4.0-14.0); the CMR in the western provinces was 2.0 (95% CI = 1.5-2.6), and the <5MR was 4.4 (95% CI = 3.2-5.7) ( Table 1 ). These differences were not statistically significant.
Cause of death was reported by interviewed families (Table 2) . Of 689 reported deaths, 404 (59%) were attributed to infectious diseases, which also might have been responsible for other deaths for which the cause was reported as unknown. War-related violence accounted for no deaths in the west and for seven (1.6%) of 443 deaths reported in the east, compared with 69 (11.1%) of 624 violent deaths recorded by IRC in 2000 and 84 (9.4%) of 894 violent deaths in 2001 (3).
On the basis of these results, the nationwide CMR is 2.2 deaths per 1,000 population per month, which exceeds the CMRs reported for all other nations in 2001 (4) . If mortality among the approximately 5 million inaccessible persons who were not surveyed in the eastern provinces is at least as high as that in the areas surveyed, the nationwide CMR is approximately 2.4 deaths per 1,000 population per month. population per month reported in 1997, the year before the outbreak of war (4) . As is usually the case in protracted war settings, violence was not reported as the major cause of death (2) . In both the war-affected and the nonwar-affected areas surveyed, febrile illness and diarrhea associated with infectious diseases were the most commonly reported causes of death. This might reflect deteriorating economic and health conditions combined with the disruption of the health-care system. During January 1999-August 2001, three nongovernment organizations recorded substantially elevated CMRs through population-based sample surveys of specific health zones with populations ranging from 62,000 to 347,000 persons. During January-August 2001, Doctors Without Borders documented CMRs of 1.2-9.0 deaths per 1,000 population per month in five health zones in five provinces (5) . During 1999-2001, IRC conducted 11 surveys in seven health zones in the five eastern provinces. These surveys, with recall periods of 14-17 months, documented CMRs of 2.7-12.1 deaths per 1,000 population per month (3) . Through an extrapolation process, these two IRC surveys were used to estimate an average CMR of 5. The findings in this report are subject to at least four limitations. First, avoiding areas with the worst security conditions probably resulted in underestimating CMRs. Second, data from past surveys conducted by IRC might not be comparable because different methods were used to select health zones. Third, because empty households experienced more deaths than occupied households (6), CMRs probably were underestimated. Finally, no formal verbal autopsy procedure was followed, and no independent confirmation of the deaths was sought. Epidemiologists can provide timely and representative health data to assess the public health impact of armed conflict. After the first series of IRC surveys conducted in 2000, the UN Security Council passed a resolution demanding the withdrawal of foreign troops (7) . The impact of the second round of IRC surveys conducted in 2001 on the current peace process is unclear. Epidemiologic techniques involving creative, flexible, and practical measurement techniques need to be developed further and employed on a regular basis to address the public health consequences of armed conflicts. Humanitarian efforts in DRC should focus on the war-affected eastern areas and on controlling infectious diseases. During 1991-2001, estimated worldwide measles vaccination coverage ranged from 69% to 76%. However, worldwide figures mask regional and national disparities. During this period, estimated coverage for the WHO regions of the Americas, Europe, and the Western Pacific was 82%-94%; estimated coverage for the Eastern Mediterranean Region was 67%-73%, and coverage in the South East Asia Region was 50%-72%. The African Region had the lowest estimated coverage, at 51%-60%.
Since 2000, WHO and UNICEF have recommended that, in addition to achieving high coverage with the first dose of measles vaccine, all children be offered a second opportunity for measles vaccination to maximize both individual and population immunity (7). This represents a second opportunity for measles immunization for children who did not receive measles vaccine from the routine program and for those who did not develop immunity to measles after receiving measles vaccine. During 1997-2001, a total of 156 (82%) of 191 countries provided a second opportunity through supplementary immunization activities or through routine health services (6) (Figure 2 ). To prevent these deaths, stronger political commitment is needed to provide all children worldwide with two opportunities for measles immunization.
To estimate cause-specific deaths, GBD first estimates a total number of worldwide childhood deaths based on WHO life table estimates (4). Total deaths are classified into three groups according to a model derived from the WHO mortality database (4). Within the communicable disease category, the contributions of individual causes of death are estimated based on data from multiple sources (e.g., vital registration systems, population laboratories, surveys, and epidemiologic modeling of specific conditions) (4). An alternative approach using a model to estimate measles-associated morbidity and mortality based on country-specific data, including demographic profiles, vaccine coverage, and estimated case-fatality ratios, determined that approximately 805,000 measles-associated deaths occurred globally during 2000, compared with the 777,000 deaths annually estimated through the GBD project (5) .
Countries report measles vaccination coverage routinely to WHO. Coverage usually is determined by the number of doses of vaccine delivered through routine health services divided by the birth cohort of the previous year. When reports are not received, WHO estimates the most likely coverage based on previous reports from the country or current reports from countries with historically similar vaccination coverage. During 2001, a total of 159 countries representing 90% of the global population reported measles vaccination coverage to WHO; coverage was estimated for the remaining countries. To supplement this information, WHO requests that countries report on an annual basis results from any coverage surveys conducted (6) .
According to GBD, of the estimated 777,000 worldwide measles deaths in children during 2000, approximately Editorial Note: Although substantial progress has been made in reducing measles deaths globally, in 2000, measles was estimated to be the fifth leading cause of mortality worldwide for children aged <5 years (4). Measles deaths occur disproportionately in Africa and South East Asia. In 2000, the African Region of WHO, with 10% of the world's population, accounted for 41% of estimated measles cases and 58% of measles deaths; the South East Asia region, with 25% of the world's population and 28% of measles cases, accounted for 26% of measles deaths (4). The burden of mortality in Africa reflects low routine vaccination coverage and high case-fatality ratios. In South East Asia, where vaccination coverage is slightly below average worldwide levels, the large population amplifies the number of cases and deaths resulting from ongoing measles transmission.
The overwhelming majority of measles deaths in 2000 occurred in countries eligible to receive financial support from the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization's Vaccine Fund (WHO, unpublished data, 2003). The majority of measles deaths occur among young children living in poor countries with inadequate vaccination services. Like human immunodeficiency virus, malaria, and tuberculosis, measles can be considered a disease of poverty. However, unlike these diseases, measles can be prevented through vaccination.
Support from the Vaccine Fund for strengthening vaccination services and raising routine vaccination coverage can help reduce the high burden of measles. However, in countries with historically inadequate vaccination services, routine vaccination alone is not sufficient to reduce measles deaths or to achieve measles control because the large numbers of older children who missed routine vaccination remain susceptible to measles. The Measles Mortality Reduction and Regional Elimination Strategic Plan 2001-2005 outlines four main elements to reduce measles mortality: 1) achieving high (i.e., >90%) vaccination coverage nationally and in each district with the first dose of measles vaccine administered through routine health services to children who are aged 9 months or slightly older, 2) offering a second opportunity for measles immunization to all children, 3) establishing effective surveillance for measles, and 4) improving case management (3). Countries are encouraged to review measles epidemiology, develop a 3-5 year plan for measles mortality reduction (8), identify reasons for low routine coverage, strengthen routine vaccination services, improve vaccination safety, and integrate measles vaccination activities with other public health activities as appropriate.
Although well-conducted supplemental vaccination activities can increase population immunity substantially and reduce measles cases and deaths, new birth cohorts rapidly add susceptible persons to the population. Bolstering routine vaccination services to ensure that the majority of infants receive measles vaccine and other vaccines is essential to sustain the impact of measles mortality reduction activities.
In 2001, the Measles Partnership was formed to reduce measles deaths in Africa. Members of this partnership include WHO, UNICEF, the United Nations Foundation, the Ameri- Surveillance to assess burden of disease and guide vaccination policy remains critical. Outbreak investigations should be used as an opportunity to learn about the changing epidemiology of measles. These investigations can provide information about patterns of transmission, including case-fatality ratios and age distribution and vaccination status of cases. Online know what matters.
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Update: Adverse Events Following Civilian Smallpox VaccinationUnited States, 2003
During January 24-May 9, 2003, smallpox vaccine was administered to 36,217 civilian health-care and public health workers in 55 jurisdictions to prepare the United States for a possible terrorist attack using smallpox virus. This report updates information on vaccine-associated adverse events among civilians vaccinated since the beginning of the program and among contacts of vaccinees, received by CDC from the Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS) as of May 9.
In this vaccination program, CDC, the Food and Drug Administration, and state health departments are conducting surveillance for vaccine-associated adverse events among civilian vaccinees (1) . As part of the vaccination program, civilian vaccinees receive routine follow-up, and reported adverse events after vaccination receive follow-up as needed. The U.S. Department of Defense is conducting surveillance for vaccine-associated adverse events among military vaccinees and providing follow-up care to those persons with reported adverse events.
Adverse events that have been associated with smallpox vaccination are classified on the basis of evidence supporting the reported diagnoses. Cases verified by virologic testing, or in some instances by other diagnostic testing, are classified as confirmed (Table 1 ). Cases are classified as probable if possible alternative etiologies are investigated and excluded and supportive information for the diagnosis is found. Patients are classified as suspected if they have clinical features compatible with the diagnosis, but either further investigation is required or investigation of the case did not provide supporting evidence for the diagnosis. All reports of events that follow vaccination are accepted (i.e., events associated temporally); however, reported adverse events are not necessarily associated causally with vaccination, and some or all of these events might be coincidental. This report includes cases reported as of May 9 that either are under investigation or have a reported final diagnosis. Because of ongoing discussions of final case definitions, numbers and classifications of adverse events might change and will be updated regularly in MMWR.
In collaboration with the Smallpox Vaccine Safety Working Group of the Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices, a case definition for myo/pericarditis has been developed and will be described in a subsequent MMWR. Using this definition to categorize all reports received through May 9, a total of 24 cases are consistent with the definition of myo/pericarditis; one of these was a new report received during May 3-9 (Table 1) .
During May 3-9, no cases of eczema vaccinatum, erythema multiforme major, fetal vaccinia, or progressive vaccinia have been reported (Table 1) . One case of suspected postvaccinial encephalomyelitis (PVE) was reported.
A man aged 38 years with a history of heavy tobacco use had acute respiratory distress and hypoxia on April 18, a total of 10 days after primary smallpox vaccination. He had a diagnosis of acute epiglottitis and was hospitalized and treated with intravenous corticosteroids, bronchodilators, antibiotics, and intermittent lorazepam for agitation. He improved and was discharged on April 25 on an oral steroid taper and bupropion to aid in smoking cessation.
On April 26, he had acute behavioral changes characterized by intense agitation, emotional lability, and confusion, and was readmitted. On examination, the patient was afebrile and oriented with no focal neurologic deficits, but with moderate difficulty with concentration. Computerized tomography (CT) of the head showed several punctate areas of deep white matter hypodensity. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain with and without gadolinium displayed multiple nonenhancing punctate areas of increased signal in the deep subcortical white matter seen mainly on fluid attenuation inversion recovery (FLAIR) sequences, a nonspecific finding potentially consistent with a history of heavy smoking, severe hypertension, or amphetamine use. Laboratory studies showed an elevated creatine phosphokinase (CPK) of 3,000 u/L (normal: <175 u/L), and a urine toxicology screen was positive for marijuana and benzodiazepines; other studies were normal. Cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) protein, glucose, cell counts, and markers of acute demyelination (oligoclonal banding, IgG indices) were normal; CSF polymerase chain reaction for herpes simplex virus and vaccinia virus were negative. An electroencephalogram (EEG) showed changes consistent with benzodiazepine effect. The patient's behavioral changes improved, CPK levels decreased to 278, and he was discharged on April 29 with a diagnosis of steroid-induced psychosis.
On May 3, the patient suffered an uprovoked generalized tonic-clonic seizure. An MRI was unchanged from the previous scan. However, post-infectious demyelination was considered because of the patient's smallpox vaccination history. He was placed on phenytoin, steroids were increased, and he was discharged the following day with a diagnosis of post-infectious encephalomyelitis. As of May 8, the patient remained mildly confused and emotionally labile.
During May 3-9, one other serious adverse event was reported for hospitalization and antibiotic administration, and 23 other nonserious events were reported (Table 2) . Among the 488 vaccinees with reported other nonserious adverse events during January 24-May 9, the most common signs and symptoms were fever (n = 92), rash (n = 88), headache (n = 82), pain (n = 78), and fatigue (n = 74) ( Table 2 ). All of these commonly reported events are consistent with mild expected reactions following receipt of smallpox vaccine. Some vaccinees reported multiple signs and symptoms.
During this reporting period, no vaccinia immune globulin was released for civilian vaccinees. No cases of vaccine transmission from civilian vaccinees to their contacts have been reported during the vaccination program (Table 3) . A total of 10 cases of transmission from military personnel to civilian contacts have been reported. Surveillance for adverse events during the civilian and military smallpox vaccination programs is ongoing; regular surveillance reports will be published in MMWR. Table 1 (eight inadvertent inoculation, and two ocular vaccinia). * Under investigation or completed as of May 9, 2003 ; numbers and classifications of adverse events will be updated regularly in MMWR as more information becomes available. † Events that result in hospitalization, permanent disability, life-threatening illness, or death. These events are temporally associated with vaccination but are not necessarily causally associated with vaccination. § Includes one case of hospitalization for antibiotic administration. ¶ Include expected self-limited responses to smallpox vaccination (e.g., fatigue, headache, pruritis, local reaction at vaccination site, regional lymphadenopathy, lymphangitis, fever, myalgia and chills, and nausea); additional events are temporally associated with smallpox vaccination but are not necessarily causally associated with vaccination.
Reported by: Smallpox vaccine adverse events coordinators. National Center for Infectious Diseases; National Immunization Program, CDC.
Editorial Note: PVE is a rare adverse event associated with smallpox vaccination (2) (3) (4) (5) . Estimates have varied, but occurrence is thought to range from 2.4-12.3 cases per million vaccinees depending on age, vaccination status, and surveillance methods (2-4) ; approximately 15%-25% of PVE cases are fatal, and approximately 25% of survivors develop substantial neurologic sequelae (2) . Although the exact pathogenesis is unknown, it is likely that both a direct, vaccinia-associated acute viral encephalomyelitis and an autoimmune-mediated inflammatory reaction resulting in postvaccination demyelination (acute disseminated encephalomyelitis [ADEM]) occur (6) . Patients with PVE show signs of encephalitis (alteration of mental status and focal neurologic deficits), myelitis (upper-and lower-motor neuron dysfunction, sensory level and bowel and bladder dysfunction), or both. Rarely, vaccinia virus might be detected in CSF (7) .
Several features of this case are not typical of PVE. Examination on April 26 showed only difficulties with concentration; no focal deficits or encephalopathy were observed. Neurodiagnostic studies, including CSF examination and EEG, were normal. Consideration of PVE followed seizure. MRI findings before and after the seizure might indicate demyelination consistent with ADEM, but might also be consistent with the patient's heavy smoking history, although unusual in a person aged <50 years. Although neither MRI displayed the multifocal enhancing white matter lesions associated typically with ADEM, it is unknown whether very early treatment with high-dose steroids might impact MRI findings of ADEM. Other potential etiologies for development of a seizure in this patient include bupropion use (8, 9) . Investigation of this case is ongoing.
This case highlights the difficulty in diagnosing PVE. The diagnosis is exclusionary. Temporal association with vaccination does not necessarily indicate causality because acute encephalomyelitis might be caused by many different metabolic, toxic, and infectious conditions (10) , and appropriate diagnostic studies, including serum chemistry profile, neuroimaging, blood cultures, and CSF examination, should be pursued as indicated. In the setting of a recent smallpox vaccination, patients with acute mental status changes, focal neurologic deficits, or white matter lesions on MRI must be evaluated for other more common causes of encephalomyelitis and treatable etiologies such as herpes simplex encephalitis should be excluded. Neurologic adverse events following smallpox vaccination should be reported promptly to state health departments and to VAERS.
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* Ratio of current 4-week total to mean of 15 4-week totals (from previous, comparable, and subsequent 4-week periods for the past 5 years). The point where the hatched area begins is based on the mean and two standard deviations of these 4-week totals. 
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